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Abstract
We argue that it is logically possible to have a sort of both reality and locality in
quantum mechanics. To demonstrate this, we construct a new quantitative model
of hidden variables (HV’s), dubbed solipsistic HV’s, that interpolates between the
orthodox no-HV interpretation and nonlocal Bohmian interpretation. In this model,
the deterministic point-particle trajectories are associated only with the essential
degrees of freedom of the observer, and not with the observed objects. In contrast
with Bohmian HV’s, nonlocality in solipsistic HV’s can be substantially reduced
down to microscopic distances inside the observer. Even if such HV’s may look
philosophically unappealing to many, the mere fact that they are logically possible
deserves attention.
Keywords: hidden variable; locality; particle trajectory; observer
1 Introduction
The no-local-hidden-variable theorems [1, 2, 3] for quantum mechanics (QM) have pro-
found, but not unambiguous [4], implications on the nature of objective physical reality –
reality supposed to exist even without observations. Two typical but mutually confronting
views inferred from these theorems are (i) that nature is local but objective reality does
not exist [5, 6, 7], or (ii) that objective reality exists but is not local [1, 8, 9]. Moreover,
many seem to agree that an intermediate option, which would retain both objective reality
and locality, is not possible.
With a motivation to reduce the confrontation between these two views, as well as
to demonstrate that an intermediate option is at least not impossible, in this paper we
propose a new “hybrid” approach. In this approach, some elements of each of the two
options are combined into a new interpretation that, to a certain extent, retains both
objective reality and locality. But of course, saving both objective reality and locality
cannot be without a price. It turns out that our intermediate approach naturally leads
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to a so-called solipsistic1 reality, the meaning of which will become clear through the rest
of the paper.
To understand the basic idea, consider first a variant of the approach without objective
reality. This approach asserts that there is no reality except the observed reality. Presum-
ably, any observation ultimately happens in some part of a (conscious) brain, which is an
object well localized in space. In this sense, observations are local events. In particular,
when an experimentalist (say, Alice) studies nonlocal EPR correlations, then all what she
really observes are signals conveyed to her brain, even if some of these signals originated
from a distant apparatus that measured spin of a distant member of the EPR pair. In
this way Alice can insist that, from her point of view, entangled particles and the distant
apparatus do not really exist. From her point of view, all what exists are her observations,
which are local. For her this is the only reality. But since this is her reality, it is not
objective reality. In this way locality is saved with a price of loosing objective reality.
Now our approach can be understood as a relatively small modification of the above.
What if the Alice’s subjective observations are actually a result of some objective physical
processes in her brain? That would promote her subjective reality into an objective one.
And what if it is still true that other objects (such as entangled particles and spatially
separated measuring apparatuses supposed to measure spins of these particles) are not
real? That would retain locality. So in this way, it would be possible to have both
objective reality and locality.
In this paper we construct an explicit quantitative model of objective reality inspired
by the qualitative idea above. Our model can be thought of as a variation of the Bohmian
hidden variable (HV) theory [10, 11, 12], with a difference that objective existence and
deterministic trajectories are ascribed only to those particles which describe the degrees
of freedom ultimately observed by the observer. We show in detail how such a model is
compatible with all measurable statistical predictions of QM.
Before starting with a quantitative analysis, there is one additional important problem
to be addressed at a qualitative level. What if there is more than one observer, say Alice
and Bob? Alice could be egocentric by believing that only she really exists, but Bob, who
may be conscious of his own observations, would strongly disagree. (Likewise, the author
of this paper could believe that only he exists, but the reader of it would not buy it.) So,
to avoid such an egocentric view of reality, it is necessary to associate objective reality (in
our model, particle trajectories) with each conscious observer. Then each of them is local
as an individual, but what if Alice observes one member of the EPR pair, while Bob, at
the same time, observes the other? To explain the EPR correlations, shouldn’t real Alice
and real Bob mutually interact in a nonlocal way?
While such a nonlocal interaction is one of the possibilities (which we shall demonstrate
explicitly in a variant of our model), there is also a way to avoid it. The crucial observation
is that Bob cannot determine experimentally whether Alice is really conscious, and if she
is, whether her state of consciousness is consistent with his own. (And vice versa, of
course.) Therefore, the consistency with measurable EPR correlations does not require
their states of consciousness to be correlated. Consequently, HV’s associated with Alice
can be independent of HV’s associated with Bob, which avoids nonlocality. Of course,
1The word “solipsistic” is borrowed from philosophy, where it refers to the view that subjective mental
experiences are the only true reality.
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Alice can hear that Bob tells her what his observations are. That information about Bob
available to Alice can be correlated with other Alice’s observations, in agreement with
predictions of QM. But the point is that an Alice’s observation is correlated with another
Alice’s observation, not with another Bob’s observation. What Alice observes that Bob
tells her that he observes is not necessarily what Bob really observes, and not because
Bob is lying, but because Bob as observed by Alice is not real. There is a real Bob, but
this is not the one observed by Alice.
Such solipsistic reality is the price we pay for saving both reality and locality. One
may think that the price is too big, and we do not insist that it isn’t. Yet, we do claim
and insist that such a possibility is logically consistent and compatible with all measured
predictions of QM. In our opinion, this is a sufficient reason to explore such a possibility
in more detail. Indeed, in the paper we shall see how such a view of reality naturally
emerges from our simple quantitative model of HV’s, fully compatible with measurable
predictions of QM.
To avoid possible misunderstanding, when we say that solipsistic HV’s are compatible
with all measured predictions of QM, we do not say that there are specific experiments
which provide a direct evidence for the existence of such HV’s. Instead, we merely say
that the measurable predictions of solipsistic HV’s do not seem to differ from those of
other known interpretations, such as the orthodox no-HV interpretation or the Bohmian
interpretation. Hence, in this paper we deal with the general theory of quantum measure-
ments to understand how the standard measurable predictions of QM can be reproduced
from solipsistic HV’s in general. But we do not compare the predictions of solipsistic
HV’s with actual specific experiments, because, with our present understanding of theory
and experiments, we do not see how such specific experiments could help to determine
whether the solipsistic HV’s are viable or not. Hopefully, it might change in the future.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we review the essential and inessential
aspects of the Bohmian interpretation, in a manner that allows us to understand why
exactly this interpretation works and which aspects of it could potentially be abandoned.
Then in the central section, Sec. 3, we explain how the particle ontology of the Bohmian
interpretation can be substantially reduced by replacing it with a new HV model, how
that leads to a substantial reduction of nonlocality involved, and how such a model can
be given a natural solipsistic interpretation in terms of particle trajectories describing the
essential degrees of freedom of the observer. In Sec. 4 we generalize the model to the case
of many observers. Finally, a qualitative conceptual discussion of our results, as well as a
conclusion, are given in Sec. 5.
2 Essential and inessential aspects of Bohmian inter-
pretation
The Bohmian interpretation is usually exposed by first presenting the equations of motion
for particle trajectories, and then explaining why such trajectories are compatible with
all probabilistic predictions of QM [10, 11]. In our opinion, such a top-down approach
may not be the best way to teach Bohmian interpretation. To understand more deeply
why this interpretation works, it may be better to use a bottom-up approach in which
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the ordering of exposition is reversed.
Such a bottom-up approach is what we do in this section. We first present the
interpretation-independent essentials of the quantum theory of measurements, and then
ask what kind of new objects should we have and what kind of law should they satisfy
in order to obtain compatibility with measurable predictions resulting from QM. In this
way it is easier to distinguish between essential and inessential aspect of the Bohmian
interpretation. This, of course, is valuable by itself, but our main motivation for doing
it is to prepare us for the next section (Sec. 3). Namely, with such an exposition of the
Bohmian theory it is easier to understand how the Bohmian theory can be replaced by
a substantially different theory (sharing only the essential aspects with it), which the
subject of the next section is.
2.1 Interpretation-independent essentials of the quantum the-
ory of measurement
Suppose that one wants to measure the observable described by the Hermitian operator
Kˆ with eigenstates |k〉 and eigenvalues k. To do that, one needs a measuring apparatus
in an initial state |Φ0〉 and interaction which causes a unitary transition of the form
|k〉|Φ0〉 → |k′〉|Φk〉, (1)
where |Φ0〉 and |Φk〉 are macroscopically distinguishable states of the apparatus. In prac-
tice, macroscopic distinguishability means that |Φ0〉 and |Φk〉 are many-particle states
the wave functions of which have a negligible overlap in the configuration space. To be
more explicit, let xb, b = 1, . . . , n ≫ 1, denote positions of n particles constituting the
apparatus, and let us introduce a shorthand notation
(x1, . . . ,xn) ≡ ~x. (2)
The negligible overlap of wave functions Φk(~x) ≡ 〈~x|Φk〉 means that
Φk1(~x)Φk2(~x) ≃ 0 for k1 6= k2. (3)
Thus, the unitary process (1) corresponds to a measurement of Kˆ in the following sense:
When the measured system is initially in the state |k〉, then the measuring apparatus is
finally found in the macroscopic state |Φk〉. This is a reliable measurement owing to the
fact that the apparatus states are macroscopically distinguishable. For later reference, we
also note that the wave functions Φk(~x) are normalized
∫
d3nx |Φk(~x)|2 = 1, (4)
where d3nx ≡ d3x1 · · ·d3xn.
In the literature it is often assumed in (1) that |k′〉 = |k〉, but such an assumption is
neither always correct nor essential. Measurements for which |k′〉 = |k〉 are only a special
case (sometimes referred to as measurements of the first kind), but in general |k′〉 6= |k〉.
For example, when |k〉 is a photon state, then its measurement usually destroys the photon
so that |k′〉 is the vacuum |0〉 for any initial |k〉.
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An interesting question is why do we have a negligible overlap (3) in the position space,
and not in some other space such as the momentum one? A detailed answer is beyond
the scope of the present paper (see, e.g., [13]), but for our purposes it suffices to say that
it can be explained by the theory of decoherence and the fact that interactions described
by the Schro¨dinger equation are local in the position space, and not in some other space.
This locality of interactions in the Schro¨dinger equation is an interpretation-independent
fact of nature which, effectively, attributes a preferred role to the position basis in an
interpretation-independent manner. (This interpretation-independent locality should be
distinguished from possible interpretation-dependent nonlocality of interactions between
hidden variables, to be discussed later.) But it should be stressed that the states |k〉 may
correspond to any basis. The position basis is preferred only for the macroscopic states of
the measuring apparatus (essentially because decoherence takes place only when a large
number of degrees of freedom is involved [14, 15]), not for the microscopic states of the
measured system.
The problem of measurement in QM becomes more challenging when the initial state
of the measured system is not an eigenstate |k〉, but a superposition
|ψ〉 = ∑
k
ck|k〉. (5)
In this case the initial state before the interaction with the measuring apparatus is |ψ〉|Φ0〉.
The effect of interaction with the measuring apparatus is determined completely by uni-
tarity and Eq. (1). Namely, unitarity and Eq. (1) taken together give
|ψ〉|Φ0〉 →
∑
k
ck|k′〉|Φk〉. (6)
The Born rule applied to the right-hand side of (6) tells that the probability for finding
the detector in the state |Φk〉 is equal to |ck|2. This probability coincides with the Born-
rule probability that the system will be found in the state |k〉 in (5). So given the Born
rule, for most practical purposes we don’t really need (6), i.e., we don’t really need to care
about the theory of quantum measurements. For these practical purposes, (5) is enough.
Yet, the theory of quantum measurements outlined above is essential in any attempt to
understand what really happens in a measurement.
Now the problem of measurement in QM can be reduced to the following question:
Given that the state after the measurement is the superposition on the right-hand side
of (6), why do we perceive that only one of the terms ck|k′〉|Φk〉 is physical? Or in more
traditional language, why this superposition “collapses” to |k′〉|Φk〉? A part of the answer
certainly lies in the fact that each of the terms contains a factor |Φk〉, because it makes
all these terms macroscopically distinguishable. This allows us to think of the right-hand
side of (6) as a single macroscopic object consisting of many distinguishable branches.
Each branch evolves independently and, for all practical purposes, behaves as if other
branches did not exist. Thus, from the point of view of any particular branch, the other
branches effectively do not exist. This sounds almost as an explanation of collapse (or
more precisely, the illusion of collapse), but one should be careful. We still need to answer
one question: Why should we take a view from the perspective of a branch as the physical
one?
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Unfortunately, an interpretation-independent answer to that last question does not
seem to exist. To answer it we are forced to work within a paradigm of a particular
interpretation, which brings us to the next subsection.
2.2 The role of particle positions
To answer the last question of Sec. 2.1, one possibility is to adopt a minimalistic approach,
in which the wave function is postulated to be the only physical entity that exists. Thus,
the branches discussed in Sec. 2.1, as parts of this physical entity, are physical entities
themselves. This possibility is better known under a more misleading name as many-world
interpretation [16, 17]. Yet, such a minimalistic approach does not seem to be sufficient.
At least, one needs some additional assumptions or axioms in order to incorporate or
explain the Born rule, which may seem too ad hoc (see, e.g., [18] and references therein).
The Bohmian interpretation is a non-minimalistic approach to answer the last question
of Sec. 2.1. It usually starts from the axiom that particles are physically real pointlike
objects having specific deterministic trajectories, but here this will not be our starting
point. Instead, we present a reversed approach, in which we first try to find out what
kind of objects do we need, and then construct such objects.
The basic idea is that the point of view from a particular branch becomes physical
because a particular branch becomes filled with something physical. In other words, it
is not the branch itself which is physical, but the entity which fills it. But what kind
of entity could that be? It must be that an entity which fills one branch does not fill
any other branch (because otherwise we could not say that only one branch is filled).
Therefore, since the branches are objects well localized in the configuration space, the
filling entity must also be well localized in the configuration space. In principle it could be
an object with a small but finite extension (for example, an experiment [19] shows that
the electron radius is smaller than 10−22 meters), but the simplest model is obtained if it
is assumed to be a pointlike object of zero size. This leads to the result that the physical
entity is described by the position
~X ≡ (X1, . . . ,Xn) (7)
in the configuration space, where n is the number of particles constituting the apparatus,
as in (2).
This shows that (7) is a good candidate to be a real physical entity. However, it
does not necessarily need to be the only real physical entity. As (7) is best visualized
as positions in the 3-space of n particles constituting the apparatus, it seems natural
to assume that the particles constituting the apparatus are not fundamentally different
from any other particles. Thus, one may extend (7) by proposing that all particles have
positions
X1, . . . ,Xn,Xn+1, . . . ,XN , (8)
where N ≫ n is the total number of particles in the Universe.
The above does not yet provide consistency with the statistical predictions of QM. QM
states that the probability density ρ for particle positions x1, . . . ,xN at time t is given by
the wave function of the Universe
Ψ(x1, . . . ,xN , t) = 〈x1, . . . ,xN |Ψ(t)〉 (9)
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as
ρ(x1, . . . ,xN , t) = |Ψ(x1, . . . ,xN , t)|2. (10)
However, in practice one cannot experimentally test this equation directly, simply because
one cannot observe all particles in the Universe. What one really observes is some macro-
scopic observable describing the measuring apparatus, which we model with the positions
(7). Therefore, a phenomenologically more interesting probability density is the marginal
(apparatus) probability density
ρ(appar)(x1, . . . ,xn, t) =
∫
d3xn+1 · · · d3xN ρ(x1, . . . ,xn,xn+1, . . . ,xN , t), (11)
obtained by averaging over the unobserved positions in (10). For t after the measurement,
|Ψ(t)〉 is well modeled by a direct product of the right-hand side of (6) with a state
describing the rest of the Universe. Using this and (3), Eq. (11) gives
ρ(appar)(~x) ≃ ∑
k
|ck|2 |Φk(~x)|2 (12)
for t after the measurement. Thus, the probability to find the apparatus in the state |Φk〉
is actually the probability to find the particle positions of the apparatus in the support
of the wave function Φk(~x). (By support, we mean the region in the configuration space
in which Φk(~x) is not negligible.) From (12) and (4) we see that this probability is
pk =
∫
supp Φk
d3nx ρ(appar)(~x) ≃ |ck|2, (13)
in accordance with the Born rule.
Now we see what property a statistical ensemble of particle positions should have in
order to be compatible with probabilistic predictions of QM. The main requirement is
that, at each time t, the apparatus particles of the ensemble should have the distribution
(11), because it is sufficient to reproduce (13). A simple way (but not necessarily the
only way!) to achieve this is to require that, at each t, all particles in the Universe
should have the ensemble distribution (10). (Of course, there is only one Universe. In
practice, a physical ensemble is realized by repeating many times the “same” experiment,
where “same” refers to the degrees of freedom which in practice can be controlled by the
experimentalist.)
2.3 The role of particle trajectories
In the last subsection we have identified some essential (and inessential) elements needed
to reproduce the Born rule (13). The most important result was that we need particle
positions with given ensemble distributions. But we are not done yet. The problem is that
the distribution (10) is time dependent. It implies that particle positions in any single
member of the ensemble should be time dependent as well. In other words, particles
should have trajectories.
In principle, the trajectories could be stochastic. However, as (10) has a deterministic
time dependence (given by the Schro¨dinger equation), it is possible that the trajectories
compatible with (10) could be deterministic as well. Furthermore, as (10) is a smooth
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function of its arguments, one expects that particle trajectories are smooth too. In other
words, particles are expected to have well defined velocities. But what that velocities
could be? To find an answer, assume that particle positions are distributed according
to (10) at some initial time t0 and ask what property should the velocities have in order
to retain the distribution (10) for any t? Let va(X1, . . . ,XN , t), a = 1, . . . , N , denotes
the velocity of the a’th particle at time t when the positions of the particles at t are
X1, . . . ,XN . Then it is not difficult to see that the velocity function va(x1, . . . ,xN , t)
should satisfy the continuity equation
∂ρ
∂t
+
N∑
a=1
∇a(ρva) = 0. (14)
For ρ given by (10), the velocity function va satisfying (14) is not unique. Nevertheless,
one particularly simple choice is
va = v
(Bohm)
a , (15)
where
v(Bohm)a =
−ih¯
2ma
Ψ∗
↔
∇aΨ
Ψ∗Ψ
, (16)
ma is the mass of the a’th particle, and f
↔
∇a h ≡ f(∇ah) − (∇af)h. Indeed, it is
straightforward to show that (16) satisfies (14) when Ψ satisfies the Schro¨dinger equation
in an arbitrary scalar potential U(x1, . . . ,xN , t). The details of this derivation are not
essential for our purposes, so we omit them [10, 11].
Eq. (16) can also be written in a more illuminating form in terms of the velocity
operator vˆa = pˆa/ma, where pˆa = −ih¯∇a is the momentum operator. With this operator
at hand, (16) can be written as
v(Bohm)a =
1
2
Ψ∗(vˆaΨ) + (vˆ
†
aΨ
∗)Ψ
Ψ∗Ψ
=
Re(Ψ∗vˆaΨ)
Ψ∗Ψ
, (17)
where in the last equality we have used self-adjointness of the operator vˆa.
There are many heuristic reasons to prefer (16) (equivalent to (17)) over many other
choices satisfying (14). The heuristic reasons include the analogy with classical Hamilton-
Jacobi mechanics [10, 11], Galilean invariance [12], and the relation with weak measure-
ment of velocity at a given position [20, 21]. Nevertheless, neither of these heuristic
reasons is essential for reproducing the statistical predictions of QM.
Now we can see why the particle trajectories satisfy a nonlocal law. The velocity of
the a’th particle is
dXa
dt
= va(X1, . . . ,XN , t). (18)
The velocity of the particle at the position Xa at time t may depend on the positions
of all other particles in the Universe at the same time, no matter how far they are from
the a’th particle. That is what is meant when said that the Bohmian interpretation is
a nonlocal HV theory. This nonlocality is a consequence of the fact that in (8) we have
assumed that all particles have positions, which is one of the essentials assumptions of the
Bohmian interpretation. Yet, as we have seen in (7) and (13), that assumption did not
seem essential for the goal of reproducing the predictions of QM. The apparatus particle
positions (7) could be sufficient, which could avoid nonlocality. The aim of the rest of the
paper is to explore that possible loophole in more detail.
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3 Reduced nonlocality from reduced particle ontol-
ogy
In Sec. 2, we have seen that only the apparatus particle positions (7), and not all particle
positions in the Universe (8), seemed essential for reproducing the measurable predictions
of QM. Could it be that only the apparatus particle positions are real, i.e., that the
particle ontology refers only to (7), not to (8)? In this section we explore the possibility
of such a reduced particle ontology in more detail.
3.1 General theory
Let us start from the mathematical fact that (16) satisfies (14), but let us not assume
particle trajectories (18). We integrate (14) over
∫
d3xn+1 · · · d3xN , which leads to
∂ρ(appar)(x1, . . . ,xn, t)
∂t
+
n∑
b=1
∇b
∫
d3xn+1 · · · d3xN ρv(Bohm)b
+
N∑
a=n+1
∫
d3xn+1 · · · d3xN∇a(ρv(Bohm)a ) = 0, (19)
where ρ(appar) is defined by (11). By the Gauss theorem, the last term in (19) reduces to
a surface integral, which vanishes. Therefore, (19) can be written as
∂ρ(appar)(~x, t)
∂t
+
n∑
b=1
∇b[ρ
(appar)(~x, t)v
(appar)
b (~x, t)] = 0, (20)
where
v
(appar)
b (~x, t) ≡
∫
d3xn+1 · · · d3xN ρ(~x,xn+1, . . . ,xN , t)v(Bohm)b (~x,xn+1, . . . ,xN , t)
ρ(appar)(~x, t)
. (21)
Eq. (20) has the form of a continuity equation for the apparatus probability density ρ(appar).
Therefore, the quantum-mechanical probability (13) of finding the apparatus in the state
|Φk〉 can be reproduced by postulating that the apparatus particles have trajectories
dXb
dt
= v
(appar)
b (X1, . . . ,Xn, t), (22)
where b = 1, . . . , n.
We stress that the trajectories (22) are very different from the Bohmian trajectories
(18). First, only the apparatus particles have trajectories in (22). Second, (22) is much
less nonlocal than (18), in the sense that the velocity of the b’th particle of the apparatus
in (22) depends only on the other particle positions of the apparatus, not on the positions
of any other particles in the Universe.
For the sake of deeper understanding of Eqs. (11) and (21), it is also useful to write
them in a different form, in terms of density matrices and partial traces. The density
matrix associated with the state |Ψ(t)〉 is the operator
ρˆ(t) = |Ψ(t)〉〈Ψ(t)|. (23)
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Its matrix elements in the configuration-space basis are
ρ(x1, . . . ,xN ;x
′
1, . . . ,x
′
N ; t) = 〈x1, . . . ,xN |Ψ(t)〉〈Ψ(t)|x′1, . . . ,x′N〉
= Ψ(x1, . . . ,xN , t)Ψ
∗(x′1, . . . ,x
′
N , t). (24)
Thus, (10) is nothing but the diagonal matrix elements of (23). Similarly, (11) is nothing
but the diagonal matrix elements of the reduced density matrix
ρ(appar)(~x; ~x′; t) = [Tr(no-appar)ρˆ](~x; ~x
′; t), (25)
where Tr(no-appar) denotes the partial trace over all no-apparatus degrees of freedom. The
numerator of (21) can be written in a similar form, by using (17) written as ρv
(Bohm)
b =
Re(Ψ∗vˆbΨ). In this way one finally obtains that (21) can be written as
v
(appar)
b (~x, t) =
Re[Tr(no-appar)vˆbρˆ](~x; ~x; t)
[Tr(no-appar)ρˆ](~x; ~x; t)
. (26)
The form (26) is a very convenient one because the properties of partial traces are well
known from quantum-information theory. In particular, matrix elements of operators of
the form appearing in (26) obey locality in the following sense: The dynamics of |Ψ(t)〉
is governed by a Hamiltonian Hˆ , i.e., Hˆ influences the Ψ-degrees of freedom. If the no-
apparatus Ψ-degrees of freedom are influenced by a local Hˆ that does not influence the
apparatus Ψ-degrees of freedom, then the partial traces of the form appearing in (26) do
not depend on these influences. For the sake of completeness, we derive this well-known
fact in the Appendix. In quantum-information theory, this fact is used as a proof that
nonlocal EPR correlations cannot be used for a nonlocal transmission of information.
Likewise, for our purpose it proves that the particle velocities (22) do not depend on such
influences on the no-apparatus Ψ-degrees of freedom.
Of course, a macroscopic apparatus has a finite spatial extension and contains n >
1 particle trajectories, so it is not perfectly local. Yet, compared with nonlocality in
Bohmian mechanics, the present model has a substantially reduced nonlocality. First,
the spatial extension of a typical apparatus is much smaller than the spatial distance
between entangled particles (see Sec. 3.2 for an example). Second, decoherence involved
in a typical macroscopic apparatus destroys entanglement between most pieces of the
apparatus, so that effective entanglement is present only at a microscopic level. For
instance, electrons within the same molecule are typically entangled, but usually there
is no entanglement between different molecules. In this sense, nonlocality is typically
reduced down to microscopic distances inside the apparatus.
3.2 Example: Measurement of EPR correlations
As an example, consider a measurement of EPR correlations by a setup sketched at Fig. 1.
Before the detections at detectors D1 and D2, the entangled EPR state is
|ψ〉 = |↑〉|↓〉+ |↓〉|↑〉√
2
=
∑
k1,k2
ck1k2 |k1〉|k2〉, (27)
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where |k1〉 and |k2〉 are eigenstates of the observables to be detected by detectors D1 and
D2, respectively. After the detections at D1 and D2 and measurement by the apparatus,
the total state can be modeled by a state of the form
|Ψ〉 = ∑
k1,k2
ck1k2|k1〉|k2〉|D1k1〉|D2k2〉|Φk1,k2〉, (28)
where |D1k1〉, |D2k2〉, and |Φk1,k2〉 are macroscopically distinguishable states of the de-
tector D1, detector D2, and measuring apparatus, respectively. (For simplicity, we have
suppressed the factors corresponding to the states of wires and the EPR source.)
Now it is not difficult to see how the hidden variables (particle trajectories) of Sec. 3.1
avoid nonlocality of the Bell theorem [1]. The Bell theorem assumes that there are some
hidden variables (HV’s) associated with the entangled measured system (described in the
basis |k1〉|k2〉) and/or separated detectors (described in the basis |D1k1〉|D2k2〉). If such
HV’s exist, then the Bell theorem asserts that they must be nonlocal. However, such HV’s
do not exist in our approach. Instead, HV’s are attributed only to the local measuring
apparatus, described in the basis |Φk1,k2〉.
3.3 Solipsistic interpretation
To save locality associated with the measurement of EPR correlations in Sec. 3.2, we have
associated HV’s (particle trajectories) only with the macroscopic apparatus that measures
the correlations, not with the macroscopic particle detectors. This corresponds to the view
that the macroscopic apparatus measuring correlations is objectively real (ontological),
while the particle detectors are not. This seems very odd for two reasons. First, from
the point of view of our everyday experience, both seem equally real. Second, if some but
not all macroscopic objects are real, then how to know in general which ones are real and
which ones are not?
To resolve this conceptual puzzle we would need some macroscopic apparatus which,
in some sense, could be believed to be “more real” than others. Fortunately, there is a
candidate for such an apparatus – the brain of the observer. All someone’s knowledge
about the world is ultimately represented by a state of his/her brain. In this sense, if
any material object could potentially be believed to be more real than others, then it
apparatus
EPR source
D1  D2
wire
wire
Figure 1: Sketch of a setup for measurement of EPR correlations. The entangled EPR pair
is produced by the EPR source. Individual particles are detected by the detectors D1 and
D2. Information about the individual detection results are transmitted by wires to the
measuring apparatus which measures the correlations between the individual detection
results.
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is the brain. Or more precisely, not necessarily all parts of the brain, but only those
essential parts which are ultimately responsible for consciousness. Neurosciences cannot
yet unequivocally identify what that essential neural correlates of consciousness are, but
the research in that direction is ongoing [22].
This leads to the solipsistic interpretation, according to which the generic measuring
“apparatus” discussed so far is actually – the conscious observer. The particle trajec-
tories are associated only with the parts of brain which are essential for the creation of
consciousness.
Of course, such a proposal is certainly not without problems. Perhaps it even creates
more problems than solves. For that reason, our model should not be taken too seriously
as a candidate for the final theory of physical reality. Yet, at least it should be taken as
an explicit counterexample to the view that local reality is not compatible with QM. Our
model explicitly shows that local reality is possible at least in principle, even if the model
is viewed as a toy model only.
One particularly difficult question with the model is the following. Presumably, a brain
becomes conscious at some particular early time of its evolution. Therefore, our model
would require that the brain particles get their objective positions at that particular time.
But how exactly would that happen? Our model says nothing about that. An enriched
model which would describe that phenomenon is certainly conceivable, but nothing simple
or natural of that form comes to our mind. Yet, we stress that this problem is independent
of the fact that our model avoids nonlocality related to measurements of EPR correlations.
Thus, we conclude that local solipsistic reality compatible with measurable predictions
of QM is at least logically possible, even if not fully satisfying in the present form. However
we are note done yet, because our analysis so far refers to a single observer only. We still
need to generalize it to the case of many observers, which we do in the next section.
4 Generalization to many observers
As discussed qualitatively in Introduction, it does not seem reasonable to associate particle
trajectories with only one observer. Instead, particle trajectories should be associated with
all of them. Therefore, in this section we generalize the results obtained so far to the case
of many observers. For simplicity, we consider the case of two observers (Alice and Bob),
but present it in such a form that the generalization to an arbitrary number of observers
is obvious.
As an example, consider an entangled pair of particles in the state
|ψ〉 = |↑1〉 ⊗ |↓2〉+ |↓1〉 ⊗ |↑2〉√
2
, (29)
where the labels 1 and 2 denote particle states localized in vicinity of the observers Alice
and Bob, respectively. (Mathematically, |a〉|b〉 is the same as |a〉 ⊗ |b〉, but we use the
symbol ⊗ when it helps equation look more intelligible.) Let Alice perform a measurement
which determines whether the state in her vicinity is | ↑1〉 or | ↓1〉. Likewise, let Bob
perform a measurement which determines whether the state in his vicinity is |↑2〉 or |↓2〉.
Then the total state after the measurement can be modeled as
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
|↑1〉|Φ(A)↑ 〉 ⊗ |↓2〉|Φ(B)↓ 〉+
1√
2
|↓1〉|Φ(A)↓ 〉 ⊗ |↑2〉|Φ(B)↑ 〉, (30)
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where |Φ(A)↑ 〉 corresponds to the case that Alice observes spin up, |Φ(B)↓ 〉 corresponds to
the case that Bob observes spin down, etc.
Now we want to associate nA particle trajectories with the observer Alice and nB
particle trajectories with the observer Bob, with velocities
dXb
dt
= vb, b = 1, . . . , nA + nB. (31)
The problem reduces to finding the appropriate quantities vb as functions of particle
positions x1, . . . ,xnA+nB. We shall see that there are two different approaches to choose
these functions: a nonlocal approach and a local one.
4.1 Nonlocal approach
An obvious possibility is to introduce a notation that generalizes (7) as
~X ≡ (X1, . . . ,XnA+nB), (32)
and to generalize (26) to
v
(AB)
b (~x, t) =
Re[Tr(no-AB)vˆbρˆ](~x; ~x; t)
[Tr(no-AB)ρˆ](~x; ~x; t)
, (33)
where b = 1, . . . , nA+nB and Tr(no-AB) denotes the partial trace over all degrees of freedom
except those corresponding to particle positions associated with the observers Alice and
Bob. This implies that the joint probability density for Alice’s and Bob’s particle positions
ρ(AB)(~x, t) = [Tr(no-AB)ρˆ](~x; ~x; t) (34)
satisfies the joint continuity equation
∂ρ(AB)(~x, t)
∂t
+
nA+nB∑
b=1
∇b[ρ
(AB)(~x, t)v
(AB)
b (~x, t)] = 0. (35)
Thus it is consistent to propose that particles have velocities (31) with
vb = v
(AB)
b . (36)
In particular, (34) assigns a zero probability that, at the same time, Alice’s particles
have positions in the first branch |↑1〉|Φ(A)↑ 〉⊗|↓2〉|Φ(B)↓ 〉 of (30), while Bob’s particles have
positions in its the second branch | ↓1〉|Φ(A)↓ 〉 ⊗ | ↑2〉|Φ(B)↑ 〉. Instead, either both Alice’s
and Bob’s particles are in the first branch, or both Alice’s and Bob’s particles are in the
second branch. Only one branch contains real particles. This means that the motion of
Alice’s particles is correlated with the motion of Bob’s particles. Indeed, this is reflected
in (33) with (32), which shows that a velocity of an Alice’s particle may depend not only
on other Alice’s particle positions, but also on Bob’s particle positions. Therefore, the
obvious approach studied in this subsection is nonlocal, which is not what we want. For
that reason, in the next subsection we consider a different approach.
13
4.2 Local approach
Now instead of (32) we introduce a different notation
~X(A) ≡ (X(A)1 , . . . ,X(A)nA ), ~X(B) ≡ (X
(B)
1 , . . . ,X
(B)
nB
). (37)
Similarly, instead of (33) we introduce two independent velocities
v
(A)
b (~x
(A), t) =
Re[Tr(no-A)vˆbρˆ](~x
(A); ~x(A); t)
[Tr(no-A)ρˆ](~x(A); ~x(A); t)
, (38)
for b = 1, . . . , nA, and
v
(B)
b (~x
(B), t) =
Re[Tr(no-B)vˆbρˆ](~x
(B); ~x(B); t)
[Tr(no-B)ρˆ](~x(B); ~x(B); t)
, (39)
for b = 1, . . . , nB. The corresponding probability densities
ρ(A)(~x(A), t) = [Tr(no-A)ρˆ](~x
(A); ~x(A); t), (40)
ρ(B)(~x(B), t) = [Tr(no-B)ρˆ](~x
(B); ~x(B); t), (41)
satisfy two independent continuity equations
∂ρ(A)(~x(A), t)
∂t
+
nA∑
b=1
∇b[ρ
(A)(~x(A), t)v
(A)
b (~x
(A), t)] = 0, (42)
∂ρ(B)(~x(B), t)
∂t
+
nB∑
b=1
∇b[ρ
(B)(~x(B), t)v
(B)
b (~x
(B), t)] = 0. (43)
Therefore the Alice’s particle velocities
dX
(A)
b
dt
= v
(A)
b (
~X(A), t), b = 1, . . . , nA, (44)
are compatible with the density (40), while the Bob’s particle velocities
dX
(B)
b
dt
= v
(B)
b (
~X(B), t), b = 1, . . . , nB, (45)
are compatible with the density (41). Clearly, the particle trajectories (44) and (45) save
locality, in the sense that the velocities of Alice’s particles do not depend on positions of
Bob’s particles, and vice versa.
There is, however, a price to be payed for saving locality. Now the motion of the
Alice’s particles is not correlated with the motion of the Bob’s particles. The particle
trajectories are no longer compatible with the joint probability density (34), but only
with the separate probability densities (40) and (41). Consequently, the Alice’s particles
do not necessarily need to be in the same branch as Bob’s particles.
The last feature is particularly interesting when Alice and Bob measure the same
observable. For instance, let the measured system be described by the state
|ψ〉 = |↑〉+ |↓〉√
2
, (46)
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and let both Alice and Bob measure whether the system is in the state | ↑〉 or | ↓〉. Then
the total state after the measurement has the form
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
|↑〉|Φ(A)↑ 〉|Φ(B)↑ 〉+
1√
2
|↓〉|Φ(A)↓ 〉|Φ(B)↓ 〉. (47)
It may happen that the Alice’s particles are in the first branch (i.e., in the support
of Φ
(A)
↑ (~x
(A)), while the Bob’s particles are in the second branch (i.e., in the support
of Φ
(B)
↓ (~x
(B)). This means that Alice and Bob may not agree on whether the measured
system is in the state |↑〉 or |↓〉. This may seem to be in contradiction with the measurable
predictions of QM, but it is not. Neither Alice nor Bob can observe any contradiction,
simply because Bob’s particle positions are hidden variables for Alice, just as Alice’s
particle positions are hidden variables for Bob. This, indeed, is fully compatible with our
solipsistic interpretation of the trajectories: Bob’s mental experiences are hidden to Alice,
just as Alice’s mental experiences are hidden to Bob.
Finally note that our result that different observers may live in different branches of the
wave function is very similar to the many-world interpretation [16, 17], briefly discussed
in Sec. 2.2. Yet, there is one crucial difference. In the many-world interpretation, there is
a copy of each observer in any of the branches. In our solipsistic interpretation, for each
observer there is only one copy living in only one of the branches.
5 Discussion and conclusion
Bohmian mechanics reproduces measurable predictions of QM by associating particle
trajectories with all coordinates in the configuration space on which the wave function of
the Universe depends. In this paper we have have seen that measurable predictions of QM
can also be reproduced by associating particle trajectories not with all these coordinates,
but only those which describe the essential degrees of freedom of the observers. Such
a restricted particle ontology substantially reduces nonlocality involved in the equations
of motion for particle trajectories. Namely, nonlocal influences between particles are
restricted to distances corresponding to the size of the observer. Moreover, quantum
coherence in a brain cannot sustain at macroscopic distances [23], which can be used to
argue that nonlocality is effectively reduced down to microscopic distances within the
observer. In this sense, such a solipsistic theory of hidden variables can be considered
local when compared with Bohmian mechanics.
There is, however, one important conceptual question to be addressed. Even though
the theory is used to calculate the particle trajectories, the theory still uses the wave
function of the Universe in the full configuration space. This wave function is not a
separable entity. So does it mean that the theory is still nonlocal?
The answer is rather subtle and depends on definition of “nonlocality”. First, even
though nonlocality and nonseparability are closely related concepts, they are not exactly
the same. While the notion of nonlocality involves an action at a distance (which is very
manifest in Bohmian mechanics), the notion of nonseparability of the wave function does
not involve action at a distance. Second, the notions of locality and nonlocality both
refer to a property in the 3-space. (Indeed, to discuss whether local or nonlocal reality
exists one must first assume that at least the 3-space exists, because otherwise such a
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discussion does not make sense [9].) On the other hand, the wave function, living in the
configuration space, is not even defined in the 3-space. In this sense, the wave function is
neither local nor nonlocal.
Third, and most important, even if the notion of “nonlocality” is redefined such that
nonseparability of the wave function is also viewed as a kind of nonlocality, there is a
subtle question whether the wave function is ontological in our solipsistic HV model. It
is certainly “less ontological” than the wave function in the many-world interpretation
(MWI), in the sense that the wave function is the main ontological entity in MWI, while
in our solipsistic HV model the wave function only has an auxiliary role, as a quantity
that serves to calculate the main ontological entities (particle trajectories) which, in turn,
obey local laws. Thus, as far as the wave function is “less ontological” in the solipsistic
model than in MWI, one can say that the solipsistic model is also “less nonlocal” than
MWI.
Of course, one could also argue that the mere fact that one needs the nonseparable
wave function to calculate something is a sufficient reason to conclude that the theory is
“nonlocal”. But then any interpretation of QM is “nonlocal” in that sense, including the
interpretations [5, 6, 7] that deny the existence of objective reality. And even then our
solipsistic HV model has a value as a bridge interpolating between two confronting views
of QM, namely those with [1, 8, 9] and without [5, 6, 7] objective reality.
To conclude, the solipsistic HV interpretation of QM offers a novel view of QM with
some advantages and disadvantages with respect to other existing interpretations. We
believe that it significantly contributes to the general conceptual understanding of QM,
even if it does not accurately describe what is “really” going on behind the abstract laws
of QM.
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A Partial traces for non-interacting subsystems
Let A and B be two quantum subsystems with bases in the corresponding Hilbert spaces
{|kA〉} and {|kB〉}, respectively. The basis for the total Hilbert space is the set {|kA〉 ⊗
|kB〉}. Let as assume that there is no mutual interaction between the two subsystems.
Then the total (possibly time-dependent) Hamiltonian has the form
Hˆ(t) = HˆA(t) + HˆB(t), (48)
where HˆA(t) and HˆB(t) act only on the systems A and B, respectively:
Hˆ(t)[|kA〉 ⊗ |kB〉] = HˆA(t)|kA〉 ⊗ |kB〉+ |kA〉 ⊗ HˆB(t)|kB〉. (49)
Hence, the unitary time-evolution operator
Uˆ(t) = Te
− i
h¯
∫
t
t0
dt′Hˆ(t′)
, (50)
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where T denotes the time ordering, factorizes as
Uˆ(t) = UˆA(t)⊗ UˆB(t), (51)
where
UˆA(t) = Te
− i
h¯
∫
t
t0
dt′HˆA(t
′)
, UˆB(t) = Te
− i
h¯
∫
t
t0
dt′HˆB(t
′)
, (52)
are unitary time-evolution operators for separate subsystems. Hence, an arbitrary (pure)
time-dependent state of the total system
|Ψ(t)〉 = Uˆ(t)|Ψ(t0)〉 (53)
can be written in the form
|Ψ(t)〉 = ∑
kA,kB
ckAkBUˆA(t)|kA〉 ⊗ UˆB(t)|kB〉. (54)
Now let
ρˆ(t) = |Ψ(t)〉〈Ψ(t)| (55)
be the density matrix associated with (54) and let OˆA be some operator acting on system
A. Their product is
OˆAρˆ(t) =
∑
kA,kB
∑
k′
A
,k′
B
ckAkBc
∗
k′
A
k′
B
OˆAUˆA(t)|kA〉〈k′A|Uˆ †A(t)⊗ UˆB(t)|kB〉〈k′B|Uˆ †B(t). (56)
The partial trace of it
TrBOˆAρˆ(t) =
∑
k′′
B
〈k′′B|OˆAρˆ(t)|k′′B〉 (57)
is then given by
TrBOˆAρˆ(t) =
∑
kA,kB
∑
k′
A
,k′
B
ckAkBc
∗
k′
A
k′
B
OˆAUˆA(t)|kA〉〈k′A|Uˆ †A(t)∆kBk′B(t), (58)
where
∆kBk′B(t) =
∑
k′′
B
〈k′′B|UˆB(t)|kB〉〈k′B|Uˆ †B(t)|k′′B〉
=
∑
k′′
B
〈k′B|Uˆ †B(t)|k′′B〉〈k′′B|UˆB(t)|kB〉
= 〈k′B|Uˆ †B(t)UˆB(t)|kB〉
= 〈k′B|kB〉 = δkBk′B . (59)
This shows that ∆kBk′B appearing in (58) depends neither on time nor on UˆB(t). Conse-
quently, the partial trace (58) does not depend on HˆB(t). Physically, it means that the
partial trace (57) does not depend on physical influences on the subsystem B.
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